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TRANSHUMANITY? 






In his 2005 article “In Defense of Posthuman Dignity,”1 Nick Bostrom 
presents a transhumanist response to various ethical criticisms of emerging 
human enhancement technologies. Bostrom is a strong proponent of 
“transhumanism,” a relatively recent movement which promotes the use of 
biotechnology to help humans transcend our nature through material 
improvement, ultimately leading to a new state of existence which is 
dubbed “posthuman.” Those opposed to transhumanism are pejoratively 
labeled “bioconservatives” or “bioluddites” by the transhumanists. 
Unfortunately, the “bioconservative” faction, with whom we share many 
sympathies, has offered subpar arguments against transhumanist 
aspirations. While critics like Francis Fukuyama have rightly pointed out 
the possibility of abuse of biotechnology and the need to consider 
carefully what technologies we should deem permissible,2 the basis on 
which Fukuyama argues is flawed. He fears that biotechnology will 
destroy human nature, thus eliminating the foundation for morality and 
human rights. In order to protect these rights, he says that we must prevent 
any tampering with human nature by heavily regulating biotechnology. 
While there are legitimate concerns about the use of biotechnology, we 
should not dismiss all developments in biotech as immoral or illicit. What 
is needed is a firm ontological framework on which to base ethical 
judgments. The aim of this paper is to show that transhumanism, while 
revolutionary in aims, presents nothing new in terms of ontological reality. 
Human enhancement technologies will not destroy human nature. Future 
individuals with enhanced capabilities will still be fully human. The same 
categories which we currently use to make moral judgments will apply 
just as much to “our posthuman future” as they do to our current 
unenhanced state.  
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Therefore, the basis for moral judgment, for rights grounded in natural 
law, will not cease to exist. However, in order to understand this, we must 
work from a proper view of human nature. In this respect, we agree with 
the transhumanists that Fukuyama and his colleagues have not leveled 
appropriate arguments against transhumanism, although for different 
reasons than Bostrom gives. We do not think that the fruits of biomedical 
research will fundamentally transform human nature, thereby creating a 
new species of persons so advanced that the only description of them will 
be in terms of what they no longer are, namely “posthuman.” 
In this essay, we will argue that biotechnical enhancements will not 
create a new species. Enhanced humans will be precisely that, human. We 
will argue that future man, if he is to be considered a person, must retain 
rationality. Thus the classical definition of man as a rational animal will 
still hold true. Consequently, the foundation for ethics and human rights, 
i.e. rationality, will still be present. Whether these enhanced individuals 
come to be by moral or immoral means is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The alleged “posthumans” will still be rational. They will still be moral. 





The central claim of transhumanism is that human beings ought to 
pursue the development and application of technologies that will  
 
make it possible to increase human health span, extend our intellectual and 
physical capacities, and give us increased control over our own mental 
states and moods.3 
 
Prima facie, these goals appear ambitious, but reasonable. However, the 
transhumanist goes beyond merely stating that we can and should try to 
extend life spans, expand our cognitive and physical capabilities, and 
achieve better control of our moods and cognitive states. Transhumanists 
assert that the result of these projects will be a change in human nature. In 
achieving these goals, we will cease to be human and will become a new 
sort of thing, “posthuman.” 
This term posthuman is used to describe the next stage of humanity, 
attained by self-directed evolution. It is not a merely semantic change, the 
result of redefining our conception of what it means to be human; rather 
“radical technological modifications to our brains and bodies are needed.”4 
Although there is no set definition of “posthuman,” transhumanists 
generally agree that the minimum requirements to be a posthuman will be 
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given in terms of enhanced capacities and abilities. Bostrom defines a 
posthuman as someone who possesses at least one posthuman capacity, 
including increased healthspan, enhanced cognition, and enhanced 
emotion5 achieved through either redesigning the human body using 
nanotechnology or enhancing it using a plethora of means.6 Beyond 
enhancement, transhumanists speak of posthumanity as including 
“completely synthetic artificial intelligences” and “enhanced uploads.”7 
The key question is whether or not posthumans will constitute a new 
species. This is a tricky question to answer when reading the 
transhumanists. Some, like Bostrom, think that an individual can become 
posthuman while remaining a human being.8 Others, like Mark Walker, 
hold that posthumans will be a new genus.9 
 
 
The Transhumanist Understanding of Human Nature 
 
To determine why transhumanists think there will be a new species, we 
must look at the their understanding of human nature. The very name 
“posthuman” indicates that our future state can currently only be defined 
in terms of the degree to which it exceeds our current nature. Thus, the 
concept of human nature plays a crucial role in transhumanist claims. 
Unfortunately, there is no one definitive position among transhumanists 
regarding human nature. All that transhumanists seem to agree on is that 
human nature is fundamentally material and thus malleable since the 
ability and obligation to change human nature and even transcend it is the 
defining characteristic of transhumanist thought. The malleability of 
human nature is what qualifies it as capable of being transformed into a 
new species. 
This lack of clarity or concern regarding human nature is a result of the 
transhumanists’ singular focus on the goal of becoming posthuman. This 
telos dominates their writings. As a result, they pay very little attention to 
the nature they are leaving behind except insofar as such knowledge can 
be used to leave it behind. Max More, one of the leading proponents of the 
“extropian” school of transhumanism, says that biologists’ conception of 
human nature “remains useful” but is “becoming increasingly inadequate 
as our further evolution depends more on the scientific and technological 
products of our minds.”10 The end result is that technological changes will 
“render our chromosomes almost vestigial components of our individual 
and species identity.”11 
 Nevertheless, this materialistic definition of human nature in terms of 
our genetic code and evolutionary lineage must be presupposed in order to 
Thomas Aquinas: Teacher of Transhumanity? 
 
179 
argue for the possibility of biotechnological enhancement.12 Walker 
explains that humans are animals with a species specific genome resulting 
from the mutation of the genomes of our evolutionary ancestors; all of our 
powers and characteristics are rooted in our biology:13  “The history of our 
intelligence lies in a secular phylogeny, that is, with our apelike ancestors 
and indeed even more ‘primitive’ organisms.”14 Walker states that our 
distinct nature is best understood in terms of a comparison to these 
ancestors. For instance, we differ from chimps in intellectual and moral 
virtues, differences based on our biology.15 Thus, posthumanity will 
constitute a new genus because posthumans will possess significant 
biological differences from us, which will manifest themselves in 
increased abilities. Since the abilities of posthumans are vague, Walker 
must use analogy to demarcate humans from posthumans, as we do with 
chimps and men: 
 
By altering biology, transhumanists propose to improve human nature to 
the point of creating a new genus: posthumans. Perhaps the most powerful 
means to adequately conceptualize what is at stake is in terms of a 
phylogenetic analogy: posthumans will stand to us in the moral and 
intellectual virtues as we stand to chimps. The phylogenetic analogy 
underscores the importance of biology in making humans what we are: it 
is not prejudice or cultural differences that prevent chimps from 
integrating into our society, but differences in human and chimp nature. 
Chimps have congenital limitations that prevent them from understanding 
much of what we know and doing much of what we do. The confirming 
experiment is easy enough to run: send any chimp to the best private 
school in the world. The chimp is not going to succeed academically as 
well as an average human toddler, no matter how many years of intensive 
one-on-one tutoring it receives. Accepting the phylogenetic analogy 
means that we will be similarly intellectually challenged compared with 
posthumans.16 
 
The transition to posthumanity is thereby defined by altering our 
bodies to produce a speciation event. However, the precise point at which 
a speciation event takes place is unclear. Let us assume that there will be a 
specific point at which our physical phenotype will be significantly altered 
(larger muscles, better neural networks inside the brain, more efficient 
eyes) such that we would be able to perform tasks that no current human 
can. Posthumans then excel at academic and practical activities, which 
humans in their current state are simply unequipped to take on. These 
changes would presumably be achieved by germ-line selection, genetic 
alteration and psychopharmacology. Would this change in our physical 
structure be sufficient to produce a new species of posthumans? 





Problems with Transhumanist Assumptions 
 
Walker’s concept of posthumanity treats differences in kind as if they 
were merely differences of degree. He presupposes that we differ from 
chimps in kind, but only insofar as chimps cannot perform as well as we 
do in academic and moral spheres. This means that chimps do have 
rational and moral capabilities. This is not a proper distinction in kind, but 
only in degree, since both ‘species’ are assumed to possess the same 
abilities. The reason that transhumanists use these analogies is that they 
assume chimps could perform such actions if they lacked “congenital 
limitations.” 
However, there is a fundamental difference in essence between human 
beings and chimps. Chimps lack the ability to understand universals, 
abstract concepts, make abstract judgments, or perform proper logical 
deductions. They would never be able to perform academic tasks in any 
meaningful way, let alone succeed at them. If we changed the chimp 
genome, on the presupposition that rationality is entirely genetic, it would 
have a different essence. This would not be enhancing the chimp. It would 
be causing a substantial change whereby the chimp would cease to be a 
chimp. A chimp can only do what we do by becoming human. 
But if posthumans will exceed us academically and morally as we 
exceed chimps, we must ask what kind of activities posthumans will be 
capable of that we are not. Are they merely better at the same type of 
activities or are they performing activities of a completely different nature, 
activities which do not belong to reason at all? We have no idea what kind 
of super-rational activities posthumans could perform. The transhumanists 
do not either. They talk in terms of vague possibilities and analogies. 
Bostrom says that posthumans will create and enjoy music which makes 
Mozart sound like Muzak. This does not sound like a different kind of 
ability. It is just an enhanced ability. Given the general nature of their 
predictions, we can only give a general reply. It is of little use to argue 
over possibilities that the transhumanists themselves cannot precisely 
define, let alone prove to exist. Stating that we will stand to posthumans as 
chimps stand to us is of little help. Transhumanists assure us that even 
though they cannot describe in concrete terms what these powers are, 
these powers will be radically different and, clearly, being radically 
different entails that they will be vastly superior. Barring a clear 
explanation of what these activities and the corresponding powers would 
be, we are forced to assume that they are performing the same type of 
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activities that we do, but better due to more powerful versions of our own 
capacities. Posthumans will be extremely rational, not above rationality. 
The very talk of enhancement presupposes an essence, which has the 
ability to perform these actions and which stands under the change as the 
source of it. Hopkins recognizes this when he notes that there must be a 
biologically grounded human nature, otherwise improving our behaviors 
and cognition through biotechnology would be impossible.17 Assuming 
that the manipulation of the human genome is possible through one means 
or another, it is clear that if you alter the genome, and the consequence is 
enhanced ability, then you have only actualized a possibility that was 
already in the substance materially. We have only shown something which 
we are able to do to ourselves while remaining the same. Enhancement 
presupposes an innate ability to do something which can be improved.  
The reason we think remembering things more easily is better is that 
we assume that a human being has a particular essence that would be 
benefited by remembering things better. This assumes that the ability to 
remember is part of the essence of humanity. Likewise, the assertion that 
we can enhance our ability to think or to create presupposes that these 
abilities are part of what a human being is. To enhance these abilities 
cannot mean to replace them. It merely perfects them and makes what was 
potential actual. There is no change in species unless we posit that there is 
some further realm of activity, which can only be accomplished by powers 
that cannot be described as rational in any sense. 
 
 
The Thomistic Response to Transhumanism 
 
The Thomistic and, more broadly speaking, the essentialist view is that 
things have real natures which are determinate. They are not fixed in a 
Platonic sense; they are able to undergo changes. Rather, the changes that 
a substance can undergo are circumscribed by its nature. We can 
remember things more easily and think more clearly because by nature we 
can remember and think. We can have better control over our emotional 
states because control over our emotions is something proper to human 
beings. 
Given this fact, it is strange to claim that enhancement would change 
what we are. These enhancements do not introduce some new aspect or 
determination that was not already implicitly contained in the notion of 
human. We only speak of enhancing what already exists. Genetic 
enhancement productive of greater health and increased resistance to 
disease presupposes a natural disposition to be healthy and a power by 
John H. Boyer and Geoffrey Meadows 
 
182 
which we preserve this health. Because the essential nature of human 
beings includes the power of nutrition, whereby animals maintain 
themselves, and because this power is exercised through material organs, 
there is no change to the power if we realize the full potential of it by 
better disposing the matter to the operation of this power. Susceptibility to 
the common cold is not a power of human beings; fighting infection is. 
Eliminating susceptibility to the common cold by altering our genome to 
fight a specific virus does not replace one power with another or add a 
new one. It perfects the means whereby the preexisting power acts. When 
we come into contact with a particular virus or bacteria, our bodies 
naturally fight against it. Even if we are unable to cope with a particular 
virus, this does not mean we lack the general power to fight it. We merely 
lack a sufficient material means to do this. 
For Aquinas, such material changes, which result in the development 
of posthuman capacities, would not qualify as speciation events. 
Speciation is a special kind of generation. Natural changes involve three 
principles: form, matter and privation. In accidental change, the material 
cause is the individual substance which acquires a new accidental form. 
The subject is present both before and after the change. In generation, the 
material cause is the substrate which loses one substantial form and gains 
another. The substantial form present before generation is not the same as 
the form present after generation has occurred. From one kind of thing, a 
different kind of thing results. However, in the generation of living things, 
the agent cause will have the same formal nature as the thing generated. A 
speciation event is different. The offspring belongs to a different species 
than its parents. We tend to speak loosely when we say that species 
evolve. The prior species does not actually change. Rather it produces 
offspring which are of a different species. New species are created because 
before the act of speciating generation, the new species does not exist 
except in potency. This potency is contained in the generic nature of the 
parents, which is able to take on a variety of specific determinations. The 
actuality realized in the new species must be something contained within 
the proximate genus of the parents. Birds give birth to other birds. As the 
evolutionary tree shows, mutations are modifications of the ancestor’s 
nature. Even though birds and mammals are considered to have descended 
from the common ancestor reptillia, we must say that both potentialities 
were contained in the original ancestor’s essence. A fish cannot give birth 
to a bird. It can, however, due to a mutation, give birth to a different kind 
of fish or at least a creature which is very fishlike. 
What would be required for a speciation event in which humans give 
rise to posthumans? A new essence. Human beings are traditionally 
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defined as rational animals. Aquinas notes that the genus of animals is 
subdivided into rational and irrational.18 This is the primary and 
exhaustive metaphysical division of animal, for it encompasses two grades 
of animality, one more perfect, the other less perfect. This does not mean 
that irrational creatures are less animal than rational animals. Both have 
complete animality. However, in some, the complete potentiality of 
animality is more fully realized. In order to be human, then, to be a 
rational animal, the power of reason possessed by the individual must be a 
specification of animal. Rationality is a determination of animality. As 
Aquinas makes clear, 
 
The understanding of animal is without determination of a special form 
and expresses, with respect to the ultimate perfection, the nature of the 
thing from that which is material; the concept of the difference, rational, 
consists in the determination of the special form.19 
 
As a determination of animal, the power of reason is proper to rational 
animals as animals. As David Oderberg has put it, “Rationality adds to the 
purely sentient and vegetative nature of a thing.”20 If it were possible for 
rational computers to exist, they would not be human for their rationality 
would not be a determination of animality. To be a human, one must 
possess full animality along with full rationality.21 
A basic principle of Thomistic taxonomy is that the addition or 
subtraction of a difference from the definition of a thing will alter the 
species. Just as the addition or subtraction of a unit changes the species of 
number, the addition or subtraction of a difference changes the species of 
the definiendum.22 If the difference added can be reduced to the category 
of substance, we will have a new or different species in the category of 
substance. If we were to add rationality to an ox, since rationality is a 
determination contained potentially in the genus of animal, it would cease 
to be an ox and would become a human.23 If the difference introduced is 
reduced to one of the accidental categories, we will not have a different 
species of substance but a different species of accident.24 
In order for the creation or discovery of a new species, which comes 
forth from human beings, there must either be the subtraction of rationality 
and/or the addition of some further perfection, one which adds to 
rationality. The former does not concern us here, since the transhumanists 
are not interested in creating subhuman individuals.25 In order to create a 
new, posthuman species of animal, the addition of a further perfection 
must be contained potentially in the genus of animal. Thus, if from 
humans, posthumans come to be, the specific difference of posthumanity 
must be contained potentially in human nature. 
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However, it is unclear what such a perfecting specific difference would 
be. In order to create a tertium quid, a posthuman animal, the difference 
introduced must add a power above and beyond rationality. If it merely 
adds a further determination to sensitivity, e.g. the ability to sense 
electromagnetic fields, then this will not create a posthuman species, for 
the crowning perfection of the new creature will still be rationality. If the 
division of animal into rational and irrational is an exhaustive division, the 
new species must be within one of these two classes: rational and 
irrational. There is no tertium quid. If there were to be a new species of 
animal that was neither irrational nor rational, it would have to possess 
both sensibility, rationality, and some power beyond rationality which was 
a further perfection of these two previous classes. It could not simply be 
rational in a different way or be more rational. However, as we said, the 
division into rational and irrational is exhaustive. Thus, on a Thomistic 
account, there is no possibility of a new rational animal coming about 
which is not contained in the species animal rationale. 
If there cannot be a new species, we can only speak of physical 
enhancement. Aquinas recognizes that improvement in body corresponds 
to improvement in intellectual activity and cognition: “We observe ‘those 
who are refined in body are well endowed in mind,’ as stated in De Anima 
ii, 9.”26 Those who take care of their bodies are able to think more clearly. 
This does not entail that there is a difference in species when speaking of 
differences in bodily refinement. Furthermore, radical changes to the 
bodily structure of a rational animal, assuming that these changes do not 
corrupt the matter so as not to be able to receive the form of rational 
animal, do not change the species either. As noted above, Aquinas 
recognizes that there can be differences in the phenotype without altering 
human nature. Were we to add rational “to the definition of ox, it would 
no longer be an ox, but another species, namely human.”27 It would be 
rational and thus human despite the preservation of its phenotype; a 
“rational bovine” would still be four-legged, herbivore, etc.  
However, the transhumanists are not talking about a change whereby 
an irrational animal gains a power it previously lacked. They talk about a 
human being becoming better at performing various actions proper to 
humans as human. The qualifier is that these enhancements are produced 
by changes to the human phenotype. Nevertheless, the posthuman will still 
be a rational animal. As the example of the ox illustrates, these changes to 
the phenotype, which do not replace or remove rationality, would not be 
sufficient additions to place a posthuman outside the species of rational 
animal. Unlike the ox example, the differences between the human and 
posthuman phenotype would not be such as to subdivide the species. 
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Humans can be enhanced because we contain in ourselves a potential for 
change. Even if there were a difference due to technological intervention, 
this would be the actualization of a potency preexisting within us as 
human beings. 
Mutations which produce imperfections in individuals do not change 
the species of the individual. People with Down’s syndrome are fully 
human even though they possess certain congenital defects. Why would 
the same not apply to perfections rather than defects? If we were to 
produce an offspring which was better at doing what a human does qua 
human, it would not be a new species of human but a better human. 
The biological changes which transhumanists propose will therefore 
fall under the class of natural dispositions. Just as some are born good 
boxers or good runners because of physical constitution, so too will those 
with enhanced abilities be born with talents. Through enhancement, we 
can create a change in species from “bad at running” to “good at running.” 
These enhanced abilities, however, belong to the category of “quality,” not 
substance.28 This change does not alter our substantial essence, i.e. rational 
animal. To run well or poorly is accidental to being a human. Genetic 
alteration either enhances abilities we already have or destroys them by 





Given this proper understanding of speciation in light of nature and 
definition, it now seems appropriate to ask the question, by way of 
conclusion: why ought human beings to pursue posthumanity? Bostrom 
replies that it is beneficial for us.29 But who and what are we? Human 
beings. It follows from Bostrom’s line that it is better for human beings to 
cease to be human in order to fulfill ourselves as humans. This is a rather 
queer notion of self-fulfillment. Enhancement enhances us as human 
beings. These values which proponents of enhancement hold are values 
proper to us as human beings possessing a particular essence which is 
directed toward particular ends. All being posthuman entails is that we 
achieve ends proper to us as human beings in a more complete manner 
than before. If achieving ends proper to us as human beings is fully 
consistent with human nature, posthumanity refers not to a new essence or 
state of being but to merely living more perfectly. If the transhumanist 
agrees with us, then he undermines all talk about enhanced biological 
posthumans belonging to a new genus. 
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